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Introduction 
 
In this chapter we examine how the globalization of media has had a number of 
effects beyond ‘global’ and ‘local’ considerations. We are concerned here with the 
influence of new media and social media constructs on the public sphere and civil 
society. In the 1990s globalisation theorists critiqued macro-changes brought about by 
the global capitalist system by introducing the effects of the ‘local’ thus ‘glocal-
ization’ was used as a term of analysis in which local and global phenomena informed 
each other in various ways. The homogenising effect of social media 
platforms/software is both capital as well as social: privileging a particular version of 
‘the person’ ensures diversity does not intrude on the type, format, and affect/effect of 
social media. 
In terms of social media expression and the public sphere, this homogenizing process 
ensures that various public spheres, interacting with each other, thus continuing the 
local-global dynamic, will continue to privilege a particular kind of person. This 
homogenized person, interacting as a ‘sous-veilling’ ‘pro-sumer’ pushes this 
homogenization of public spheres around the world. On the surface this appears as the 
ultimate form of localized media creation. We contend that the ‘sameness’ produced 
by this process can deliver interesting affects/effects on the nation-state and media 
interaction. As a result we may not have a great difference between public spheres of 
nation-states that we might presume to exist. Media globalization seems to have 
entered a process whereby nation-states and their citizens are entering a stage of 
homogenization of the actual tools of social media. Simply put, if everyone uses 
Facebook, does this create sameness or open the door to difference and variety?  
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We find these logics of sameness demonstrated in relation to the various ways in 
which social media ‘flattens’, often by its very architecture, particular ‘styles’ of 
selfhood. We examine this flattening in relation to a number disparate, but related 
phenomena: we consider the ways in which Facebook operates as a form of lateral 
surveillance panopticon, and one in which middle-class professional norms govern the 
‘correct’ use of the site; we consider the convergence of political support and political 
subjects in the reporting and supporting of the anti-Ahmadinejad protestors in the 
wake of Iran’s 2009 election; and finally we consider the ways in which the use of 
intelligence, itself (mis)used for political endeavours, is itself being ‘flattened’ 
through the use of ‘spookipedia’, or social network site-inspired (and often 
automated) processes of identification and intelligence gathering. Rather than tending 
toward radical individualism we argue that the flattening effects of these technologies, 
themselves encroaching further and further into the everyday of citizens around the 
world, encourage a homogenization of affect, if not effects. 
 
The Facebook Self 
 
New media has changed a previously well-known media landscape. The new 
communication technologies affect the relationship between the actors of political 
communication. While in the past there was a hierarchy between the different actors, 
where the political system, media system, citizens/voters order could be set up, 
today’s political system opening towards the citizens and the new networking 
techniques of civilians has brought the two actors to almost the same level as that of 
the media and flattened this previous hierarchy of media production. 
The starting point for this section is that political communication can be connected 
with the emergence of mass democracy and mass communication, and here we further 
assert that new communication technologies lead to the democratization of the 
practice of political communication [Howard & Parks 2012; Papacharissi 2014]. 
These changes have taken place without any revolutionary change in the hallmarks of 
societies that forced the political system to give up its original role. Under ideal 
conditions, if we assume high and predictable economic and cultural development, for 
the change of political communication it is not necessary to change the socio-political 
arrangements, it is enough if the technologies are changing, which are specifically 
affecting the daily lives of people [Croteau et al. 2011]. It should be noted that the 
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previous claim is only theoretical, and it is true only under ideal conditions. The 
practice is somewhat inconsistent with the theory, often accompanied by changes in 
socio-political factors, as well [Merkovity et al. 2014]. 
The social network site (SNS) Facebook has come to occupy a central place in the 
everyday socialising of hundreds of millions of users around the world. It allows its 
users to connect with a variety of people drawn from both their professional and 
personal milieus, and places them all upon the same social plane as a social network 
connection or ‘Friend’. While Facebook’s design is often updated or changed, 
including the ability to demarcate audiences since 2011, one of the primary affects 
upon users is a ‘flattening’ of social audiences and contexts [Boyd 2011]. This 
‘flattening’ also compresses time so that all Facebook users’ posts to the site are 
collated into a single ‘Timeline’ such that, although marked by a chronological date 
of reference, they are able to be viewed at once in toto. Facebook’s design can be 
considered to be a form of virtual architecture inside which contemporary selves are 
housed and socialise with others. Architecture and spatial design regulate and guide 
particular behaviours and in so doing engender particular power effects. Facebook’s 
architecture is a mutual surveillance architecture, and itself entwined with a broader 
ensemble of discursive formations. These all contribute to privileging and shaping 
particular forms of selfhood—the neoliberal self. 
While Facebook’s role as a facilitator of social networks and self-expression can be 
seen as a conduit through which individuals connect with the world around them, it 
also acts as a means through which they might gain insight into their own self. 
Facebook has been described as an ‘architecture of disclosure’ [Marichal 2012] and 
users often feel compelled to maintain visibility within it. As a result the individual’s 
relationship with self and others is augmented. It is here that subjectivity-building and 
social relationships are entwined with myriad power relations engendered by both 
augmented relationships and the digital surveillance enclosure of Facebook. It is in 
these ways that relationships of power, knowledge, and subjectivity are connected. 
Both the design of Facebook and the ‘space’ of networked publics operate as 
structures that Facebook users must house their online personas within. From the very 
outset Facebook users find their behavioural choices limited. The options available to 
the Facebook user during the signup process provide a structure within which to fill 
out their personal details. The design choices present within the template constrain the 
available options to the Facebook user. These limitations can be seen as reinforcing 
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already existing norms such as gender and race [Van House 2011] which have power 
effects upon the Facebook users’ construction of the self. In this sense the design 
itself facilitates processes of categorisation and normalisation to which the user is 
subjected. Here then the very structural design of the Facebook Profile interface 
reinforces existing power relations and norms. From the very outset of their 
experience with the site Facebook users are subjected to the operation of power. The 
very act of constructing a Facebook Profile entails a purposive set of acts that 
constitute ‘writing oneself into being’ [Sundén 2003]. From the outset the choices 
available to the Facebook user both enable and constrain the semi-permanent display 
of self that exists as the Profile page. The elements that allow users to provide 
information about themselves within pre-given categories tend to reiterate existing 
identity norms whilst masking the contingency of these categories. 
Facebook becomes a space to produce the self performatively through an ongoing 
everyday engagement with the site. Various aspects of the self can be performatively 
reiterated by highlighting a commitment to one’s particular obligations or by simply 
rendering oneself visible within the governable terrain of the site. While performing 
these roles users often demonstrate restraint so that their posts conform to a spectrum 
of acceptable claims and behaviours related to the particular subjectivity they are 
occupying and portraying. Performances are shaped by a number of formal and 
informal regulations such as the ‘truths’ embedded within the multiple discourses that 
contribute to the performative constructions of the self. For example, in performing 
the subjectivity of being a student and all that this entails, whether it is the self-
disciplined and diligent scholar submitting assignments on time at the expense of all 
social commitments or the slacker whose social commitments intrude upon their 
studies, subjectivity is performed with an eye to ‘the rules of the game’ of being a 
student. In these ways numerous power relations are manifested whenever users draw 
upon one or other discursive materials as part of their presentation of the self. Indeed 
the very act of performing the self, of being a performatively constructed subject, is 
an exercise of power in Foucault’s sense of any given exercise of power is a 
productive act [Foucault 1984]. 
Facebook is a cultural artefact imbued with relationships of power and facilitates the 
reproduction of political order. Its architectural design, the discourses that shape user 
behaviours, and the ways in which it augments relationships all contribute to the 
production of well-regulated selfhood and political order. The ‘norms’, etiquettes, and 
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discourses related to Facebook practices all contribute to the reproduction of political 
order. Cultural artefacts and practices are hence identified as sites through which 
political order is reproduced and the operation of power is facilitated. Facebook 
extends the reach of neoliberal rationalities and operates as a space in which its users 
are able to both present and meditate upon their actions as moral subjects. As a 
technology of the self, Facebook allows its users to write themselves into being 
through largely informal practices of self-writing and to later reflect on these writings 
in the form of the Facebook Timeline. The morality of the neoliberal subject is 
ultimately linked to the political and economic spheres of production and 
consumption [Bauman 2005]. Entrepreneurial self-government is largely about 
producing good, employable citizen-consumers and thus extending the governmental 
reach into the sphere of the everyday while punishing (or threatening to, via the risk 
presented in ‘life after social networking discourses’) behaviour that is outside an 
ever-decreasing range of acceptable ‘normal’ behaviours. The corollary of this is that 
these processes are interlinked with ethics. Hence people behaving outside of these 
acceptable ranges of behaviour are cast as immoral. As Peter Kelly notes: 
 
as workers in liberal democracies we are free to choose and act, but to be 
employable or successful in the world of flexible capitalism we have to 
choose and act in certain ways—or suffer the consequences [Kelly 2013: 
11]. 
 
The stakes here, then, are those of freedom. The reproduction of neoliberal values 
ultimately relies upon the paradox of producing unfreedom within freedom. It is about 
producing a regulated range of acceptable behaviours by encouraging free individuals 
to adhere to an ever-decreasing range of acceptable behaviours, and to cast those 
outside of these acceptable behaviours as unethical and immoral. That those who fail 
to conform with the acceptable behaviours are often linked to lower social classes or 
those outside the spaces of success within neoliberal capitalism reinforces the notion 
of the ‘deserving poor’. Those that are struggling to keep afloat within the precarious 
seas of neoliberal capitalism are somehow cast as deserving of their fates due to their 
supposedly inherent immorality [Sayer 2005]. 
It has been argued by Zygmunt Bauman [2005; 2007] that the present era is marked 
by a shift from individuals as primarily ‘producers’ to a mode of existence that is 
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primarily that of ‘consumers’. He terms this ‘consumerism’ and traces the shifts from 
industrial capitalism through the dismantling of the welfare state, along with the flight 
of capital to developing countries (in which poorly paid workers perform the work 
that was previously performed in the West) and contends that a concomitant shift 
occurred from the ‘work ethic’ to the ‘consumer ethic’. Bauman contends that in each 
case, the work ethic and the consumer ethic, political order is ensured as it is 
reproduced by those interpellating the ethic, performing the work, and consuming the 
goods. Facebook becomes a means through which this ethic is extended into the 
everyday, where individuals are themselves commodified, and where spectacular 
consumption is displayed through the Facebook Profile. Truly, this is the protestant 
work ethic 2.0. 
 
Twitter and Strange Alliances 
 
In the wake of the disputed 2009 election protests erupted in Iran which were 
broadcast around the world by mainstream media as well as via the emerging SNS 
Twitter. Technologically-savvy Iranian protestors themselves were circumventing 
state media restrictions and disseminating information and images of state violence 
which were then being retweeted and spread via Twitter users in the West. Many 
Westerners were breathlessly calling the protests the ‘Twitter Revolution’ because of 
the role Twitter was playing in helping Iranian protestors disseminate their 
information, which was then further broadcast by a sympathetic Western audience. 
The 2009 elections in Iran saw massive waves of protest as pro-democracy 
demonstrators, supporters of the opposition leader Mir Hussein Mousavi, took to the 
streets in protest of the disputed outcome of the election. The events unfolding in Iran 
were soon being breathlessly repeated across the globe through the magnifying power 
of new media. 
The Twitter phenomenon was simultaneously being celebrated for its use in the 
spreading of information regarding the protests in Iran, and the reasons were twofold. 
Firstly, it was used by many thousands of people outside of Iran to spread messages 
of support for the pro-democracy protestors in Iran, by sending information about the 
events taking place in Iran and by changing their avatars, or profile icons, to the 
colour green to display their support for the pro-democracy protestors. Secondly, 
protestors in Iran were using Twitter to circumvent the dramatic shutdown of all 
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forms of media in Iran by the Iranian government. Technologically-savvy Iranian 
protestors used proxy IP addresses to sidestep the Iranian government’s blocking of 
Twitter. They were also able to send messages and images of violence used by the 
Iranian government to the world outside of Iran. Further, protestors were using 
Twitter, as well as SMS before the cellular networks for closed down, to organise 
protests inside of Iran. Hack (an Australian radio program that is known for it’s 
‘critical-popular’ stance on issues) covered the protests in Iran. A primary source of 
news for many of its listeners, the program framed the events less as being about 
protests directed toward the Ahmadinejad regime and more as an example of a 
‘cyberwar’. Presenter Kate O’Toole introduced the story thus: “It’s possibly the 
biggest cyberwar ever waged, with protestors in Iran dodging firewalls to post photos 
and videos despite the government’s attempts to ban the media and shut down social 
networking sites” [Hack Radio 2009]. Later in the same piece activist Geordie Guy 
from Electronic Frontiers (www.efa.org.au) described the events in Iran as “one of the 
biggest cyberwars we’ve ever seen”. The use of the language ‘cyberwar’ reflects the 
interpretation of the demonstrations by Western audiences as an event that pertains to 
technology rather than electoral politics.  
This does not yet mean that it is an effective and viable challenge to the prevailing 
socio-political order, or the state apparatus itself. While the political demands of 
many of the participants are clear enough in and of themselves, there is neither 
agreement among the participants, nor a set of developed alternatives to what can be 
considered a political power structure determining the trajectories of people’s lives in 
Iran. Winning the ‘cyber-war’ does not necessarily mean winning the political contest, 
nor does it mean that the prevailing power structure is challenged to a level that will 
push for political change on the ground. It may present such a possibility, but it 
cannot be assumed as a fait accompli.  
Media reports in the West were rapid and plentiful in celebrating the revolutionary 
potential of Twitter and its use by Iranians. The Washington Times [23rd June 2009] 
editorialised the ‘Twitter revolution’ taking place then in Iran, championing the 
‘flickering flame of freedom’ that they claimed was beginning to appear in Iran. It 
reported that the Iranian government shut down all forms of communication, other 
than the Internet, leaving Twitter as the only viable medium with which to pass 
information. Schectman [2009] urged caution in making grand claims as to the extent 
of the role of Twitter in Iranian protests, suggesting that word of mouth and SMS 
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were the most useful forms of communication. Schectman raises the position of social 
media expert Gaurav Mishra [cited in Schectman 2009] who argued that ‘one of 
Twitter’s primary contributions in the Iranian elections has been to raise awareness of 
the issue among tech-savvy users outside of the country’. 
Certainly, Twitter was extraordinarily successful in conveying information both in 
and from Iran to the West. The Sydney Morning Herald [17th June 2009] reported 
that the US government asked Twitter to postpone its planned maintenance so as to 
‘allow Iranians to communicate while their government has banned other media 
following elections’. One of the ways in which Western Twitter users were involved 
was in helping to aid Iranians sidestep governmental attempts to block Twitter. 
Doctorow [2009], in a post on boingboing.net, advised would-be activists on how to 
conduct themselves on Twitter so as to best aid Iranian protestors: “Security forces 
are monitoring this hashtag, and the moment they identify a proxy IP they will block 
it in Iran”. Further instructions implore people to use only the ‘#iranelection and 
#gr88’ hashtags to spread information on Twitter, as well as advising individuals to 
change their Twitter time-zone settings to GMT +3.30 in order to overwhelm Iranian 
security services with the number of Twitter messages appearing to emanate from 
Tehran. Doctorow [2009] implored people to ‘spread the (legitimate) word’, and 
suggested that the example of the ‘#nomaintenance’ hashtag campaign succeeded in 
convincing Twitter to postpone scheduled maintenance so as to keep the flow of 
information from Iran operating. 
Clay Shirky [TED.com 2009] argued at the time that Twitter was the most important 
technology being used in regards the flow of information about Iran. He suggested 
that the ‘real-time’ nature of Twitter messaging aided in its ability to elicit an 
emotional investment from those who use it, and that this gave an added salience to 
the ways in which people were connecting around the issue of Iran.  
Kate Crawford [2009] is particularly interested in this emotional aspect of Twitter use, 
and considered the phenomenon of individuals using Twitter who changed their 
avatars to a green colour in support of protestors in Iran. She argues Twitter’s success 
has been effective in its ability to ‘[get] people to notice and feel invested in an event’ 
[Crawford 2009]. Huppke [2009] addressed the phenomenon of Twitter becoming ‘a 
gathering place to discuss Middle Eastern politics’, and the irony of this development 
on a site on which Huppke claims ‘the primary subjects of conversation often revolve 
around “American Idol” finales, iPhones, and anything involving a Kardishan, Hilton 
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or Lohan”. Huppke [2009] admits to feeling skeptical when first exposed to the 
enthusiasm with which ‘Twitter activists’ were espousing support for the protestors in 
Iran, later finding that there was a positive in Twitter’s ability to expose previously 
ignorant individuals to information likely to make them more politically aware. 
Nonetheless, the former technology writer, Stilgherrian was scathing in his 
assessment of the reasons people changed their Twitter avatars to green, and 
suggested that there are more elements, such as class, at play that makes the situation 
more complex and nuanced than the ‘technology equals freedom’ equation 
[Stilgherrian 2009]. 
Stilgherrian’s assessment leads to an interesting conclusion – yes, there are larger 
forces at play. He astutely observes the unlikely allegiance between progressive, 
‘right-on’ technologically savvy types and the US neocons, all calling for that same 
regime change in Iran to ostensibly further the aims of an aggrieved portion of the 
population whose desired democratic outcomes were not met. This points to a 
dilemma of both authenticity as well as the structural underpinnings of the access to 
that ‘liberatory’ technology [Owen & Imre 2013]. The technology itself raises a 
number of issues that need further examination: does access to the deeper levels of 
communications among individuals provide a form of structural liberation, does this 
access merely allow more people to talk to more people, does the technology facilitate 
democratic practice? All of these problematics need greater analysis in order for us to 
understand the dynamics of new forms of social practice using the near-ubiquitous 
communicative tools and simply assuming that having people communicate digitally 
is not enough in itself. It is a similar development to that observed by Hirschkind and 
Mahmood [2002: 339–340], that of the unlikely alliance between some Western 
feminist groups and supporters of aggressive military action in Afghanistan. The trend 
that is engendering these unlikely allegiances, as well as the mobilisation of subjects 
in Iran and Ukraine willing to adopt a ‘pro-democracy’ subject position, can be 
explained by considering these events as materialisation of the same thing – global 
governmentality. 
This global governmentality can be viewed in a number of ways, and does not 
necessarily guarantee the allegiance of the protesters with each other, but certainly 
seems to have the potential to re-form social movements, whether viewing themselves 
as pro-democracy or not [Imre 2013]. Furthermore, we conclude here in this chapter, 
that suggestions of greater development of technologies, and greater usage of those 
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technologies in varying degrees, must also include the possibilities of new forms of 
democracies and democratic practices. While this is not discussed specifically in this 
chapter, we certainly point out the possibility. In this sense the present is marked by 
the spread of neoliberal capitalism and its concomitant subjectivities, all of which are 
being supported more than any sort of calls for ‘democracy’—In the case of Iran it 
was the outcome of a democratic election that was being directly challenged by 
demonstrators in Iran and their supporters outside of the country. We argue that this is 
a manifestation of a set of ideological values that extends the reach of the global 
governmentality empire of desiring neoliberal subjects. At present, far from being the 
catalyst for any sort of ‘revolution’, Twitter’s role is one that further entrenches the 
values of empire. 
 
Intelligence 2.0 
 
A more hidden example of this flattening affect is glimpsed in the world of 
intelligence. Intelligence is of obvious importance in relation to its role in providing 
information and analysis that can often have vast geopolitical ramifications. While the 
intelligence world is by necessity largely clandestine, reports into the world of 
intelligence reveal that it is as muddled as it is murky, and often subject to ‘top-down’ 
agendas in which the political will of whatever government of the day is known 
throughout agencies, themselves increasingly subject to the neoliberal logics of 
flexibility and contractualism, and encouraged to provide analysis that fits within the 
policy frameworks of their political masters. These affects are further augmented by 
rationalised systems broadly dubbed ‘spookipedia’ [Werbin 2011] in which social 
media site-inspired platforms are rolled-out to intelligence agencies. These 
technologies, and the ‘flattening’ processes of automated sorting, contribute to 
furthering the reach of neoliberal (and by extent biopolitical) logics. 
Intelligence organisations are comprised of a great many people, often with jockeying 
goals, agendas, and often rivalries. Organisations do not function on the ability of 
individuals to all go in one direction at the same time. Internal dynamics of 
competition lead to layers of complexity and a ‘muddling’ of processes. So there will 
be competition internally, there will be competition among various agencies seeking 
to do similar work, and there will be straightforward competition among individuals, 
whether they are in the same workplaces or not, to hinder their co-workers, or gather 
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the requisite information first, or quicker, or at less cost and so on. Various 
competitive possibilities will also produce a number of different kinds of data and 
information that will make the situation unclear. The human element of intelligence as 
a profession will always make it a murky and muddled practice.  
Automation and robotisation is already seen as a way in which defence and 
intelligence might supersede the limitations of human analysis and decision making 
[Singer 2009]. As robots are increasingly mobilised on the battlefield they are still 
tethered to humans at their control, but this is not a certainty into the future. The time 
taken for a human to conduct the decision making process is seen by some in the 
world of defence as a weak point—the ‘human in the loop’ that is often the only 
aspect of robotic weaponry that justifies the ethics of sending robots to kill humans—
and there are calls to allow robots to perform the decision making themselves, thus 
speeding up response times in heated situations considerably.  
A similar logic is at play within intelligence. Panoptic sorting systems [Gandy 1993] 
already gather large amounts of data from various sources which are then used to 
categorise individuals into groups, generally as found in the world of banking as ‘risk’ 
or ‘non-risk’ individuals. This is increasingly finding a home in the worlds of 
intelligence and security surveillance, which itself feeds-back into the citizenry by 
articulating desirable ‘safe’ identities to be internalised and performatively maintained 
[Barnard-Wills 2012]. Similarly, the models of intelligence software being used in 
intelligence services are able to categorise large swathes of the population and sort 
them into particular categories of ‘risk’. What is also emerging is the ways in which 
these databases are themselves modelled on SNSs such as Facebook, allowing further 
(human) analysis as intelligence employees peruse ‘risky’ profiles in much the same 
fashion as a Facebook user might peruse profiles of old schoolmates. Werbin analyses 
three of these technologies:  
 
A-Space (a Facebook-like social networking platform for intelligence 
analysts), TAG|Connect (an intelligence social bookmarking platform for 
tagging information), and Intellipedia (a wiki-style intelligence platform) – 
[which] reveals not only a significant shift to bottom-up participation and 
decision-making for the intelligence community that is reflective of 
participatory culture writ large, but also how this intelligence ‘reinvention’ 
furthers a biopolitical milieu that sorts populations of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ as a 
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basis for securing the endless and indefinite circulation of people and 
things. Given the power of security and law enforcement to take people 
out of circulation and potentially ruin their lives should an error occur (i.e. 
inaccurately tagging an individual as a ‘terrorist’), what are the dangers of 
entrusting more of this power to bottom-up systems that are, by defini- 
tion, outside of direct top-down human oversight and supervision? [These 
result in] bottom-up procedures (specifically data mining and social 
tagging) [which] necessarily produce inaccuracies and errors [Werbin 
2011: 1254–1255]. 
 
Werbin’s analysis highlights the ways in which these practices are biopolitical by 
sorting the bodies of populations, linked here through their digital identities or ‘digital 
doubles’ [Whitson & Haggerty 2008], with predictable sets of outcomes that might 
befall ‘marked’ persons should they come into contact with law enforcement 
organisations. Much as the ‘tainted’ identity displayed on Facebook jeopardises the 
individual’s employment prospects [Albrechtslund 2008], the marked ‘suspect’ 
identity produced by a suite of ‘spookipedia’ [Werbin 2011] technologies poses often 
unknowable risks to many individuals. As Barnard-Wills [2012] highlights, the only 
option for people is to behave themselves in such a fashion that they do not arise 
categorical suspicion lest they fall into the surveillance net. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Facebook, Twitter, and intelligence-gathering components of this complex array 
of social media and new communication technologies might be providing us with 
significantly new formations to work with. Fraught with danger, and based on 
assumptions of democratization, we are left with a hegemonic move that seeks to 
contain communications in a more-than-controlled and surveilled manner. This means 
the there is a privileging of particular types of monitoring, focusing on specific kinds 
of human personality traits, encouraging very particular behaviours, and developing 
an overarching system of social media interaction that is at once global and local. 
Individuals in their localities must necessarily catalogue the mundane aspects of their 
everyday lives, yet the use of the exact same software, websites, and devices designed 
by the same companies have developed a specific kind of hegemony and hegemonic 
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practice. Perhaps the next step in examining problems to do with these social media 
technologies is to examine more closely the biopolitical and thanatopolitical 
ramifications of what could possibly be a new and more dangerous stage of these 
developments. We leave this open for others to pursue in the near future. 
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ABSTRACT (up to 500 words) 
 
Social media and the public sphere has developed a specific new formation of 
communication and politics. In this chapter we examine some of the ramifications of 
this and argue that the design and application of social media presents a specific kind 
of cultural homogeneity that users must perform. Local and global interactions may 
not be creating a diversity of any kind, and is instead creating opportunities for 
simplification of surveillance as well as a pattern of privileging particular kinds of 
personality traits among users. Design itself is not democratized, and as such the 
affect and effect that we examine here is delivering a dangerous lack of diversity in 
the global social media construct. 
 
Keywords: social media, globalization, public sphere, civil society, cultural 
homogenization. 
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